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A Matter of Life And Death: Posthumous
Conception
INTRODUCTION
Posthumous birth has long been recognized by both the common
and civil law and occurs when a husband dies after the conception of
a child, but before its birth. Due to the long-established presumption
that a child born to a mother within three hundred days of her
husband's death is the legitimate child of the husband,' a posthumous
child is legally and socially recognized as the offspring of the father
and receives the benefits flowing from that recognition.
Recent scientific developments challenge the conventional
presumption by demonstrating that procreation may occur after
death. Through artificial insemination, individuals may store their
gametes for future use, thus prolonging their reproductive
capabilities beyond life. The use of artificial insemination to
reproduce after the death of one or both of the parents is often called
"posthumous conception."2 Posthumous conception challenges the
validity ofpaternity and inheritance laws by blurring the once bright
lines between death and life.
Posthumous conception is a phenomenon the law has largely
ignored and one that illustrates the necessity of a legal system that is
not only reactionary, but progressive as well. The majority of states'
statutes continue to implicitly deny posthumously conceived children
legal status and inheritance rights by utilizing conventional filiation
and inheritance laws that never contemplated this medical
development. Faced with outdated legislation, some courts have
found the statutes obsolete and inapplicable to the children's
situation.3 Other states, possibly fearing the disruption of estates as
Copyright 2004, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
1. La. Civ. Code art. 185.
2. This article only addresses the inheritance rights of children conceived after
the death of their fathers. Although posthumous conception following the death of
a mother is possible, it requires a surrogate for gestation and thus raises different
issues.
There are several reasons a man may wish to preserve his sperm for posthumous
use: when faced with the threat of sterility caused by chemotherapy or radiation,
military service in war, or even when contemplating suicide. See Sheri L. Gilbert,
Fatherhood from the Grave: An Analysis of Postmortem Insemination, 22 Hofstra
L. Rev. 521,525-26 (1993) (noting increased donation during the Vietnam conflict
and more recently during the Persian Gulf Conflict); John A. Gibbons, Who's Your
Daddy?: A Constitutional Analysis of Post-Mortem Insemination, 14 J. Contep.
Health L. & Pol'y 187, 190 (1997).
3. In both In re Estate of William J. Kolacy and Woodward v. Comm 'n ofSoc.
Security, the courts ignored paternity and inheritance laws they found had not
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well as other problems that posthumously conceived children bring
to the law, expressly prohibit granting a posthumously conceived
child any right to inherit from its father. The constitutional validity
of strict prohibitions against inheritance or legal status is highly
questionable.4 To avoid the inconsistent case-by-case determinations
of courts, constitutional scrutiny, and antiquation, legislatures should
address the need for changes in the law created by posthumously
conceived children and create a means by which they may achieve
legal status.
Until 2001, Louisiana was among those states that denied
posthumously conceived children inheritance rights or legal status.5
However, during the 2001 Regular Session, the Louisiana Legislature
passed a statute granting posthumously conceived children
inheritance rights when certain criteria are satisfied.6 In doing so,
Louisiana became the first state to develop a mechanism by which
most posthumously conceived children will attain legal status and
inheritance rights while also effectively balancing various competing
interests. By recognizing inheritance rights for posthumously
conceived children, Louisiana has acknowledged that the law can
adapt to changes in medical technology and that modem families are
formed in a variety of ways. Moreover, by balancing the state's
interest with those of the child and the decedent, Louisiana's
legislation is a model for other states struggling to effectively
legislate on the matter. Nonetheless, Louisiana's legislation, though
an important beginning, may be improved.
Part I of this comment examines the problems that arise in both
common law states and Louisiana when the legal rights of a
posthumously conceived child are analyzed under traditional
inheritance laws. Part Id describes the Louisiana legislation granting
legal status to posthumously conceived children. In Part EI, the
unique clash of competing interests caused by posthumous conception
is examined. Part IV compares Louisiana's legislation with the
jurisprudence and legislation of other states. Finally, Part V
addresses the problems with Louisiana's legislation and suggests
some potential reforms.
contemplated posthumously conceived children in order to curb the harsh
consequences that would result from a strict application of the statutes. In re Estate
of William J. Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002). Woodward
v. Comm'n of Soc. Security, 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002). See infra Part IV.A.
But see Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz. 2002) (discussed
infra Part IV.A.6).
4. See infra Part lV.C.
5. See infra Part II.A.1-2.
6. La. R.S. 9:391.1 (2001). See infra Part III.
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I. PROBLEMS OF PATERNITY AND INHERITANCE
Conventional filiation and inheritance laws deny a posthumously
conceived child legal status as the child of its biological father. The
result is not often intentional, but occurs because the law did not
consider the possibility of a medical phenomenon such as posthumous
conception. Although it may be possible for a posthumously conceived
child to inherit a mortis causa donation from its father in common law
states,7 the child is nonetheless denied intestate inheritance and other
benefits. Similarly, Louisiana's succession laws prevent a
posthumously conceived child from receiving intestate or testate
inheritance by denying it the capacity to inherit.'
A. The Posthumously Conceived Child is Not a "Child"
The posthumously conceived child's difficulty in attaining legal
recognition is a result of traditional laws that do not contemplate the
possibility of posthumous conception.' Children are classified as either
legitimate or illegitimate.'0 Legitimate children are conceived or born
during marriage or have been legitimated. " By definition,
posthumously conceived children are not legitimate because they are
neither born nor conceived during marriage, nor can they be
legitimated by a deceased parent. A presumption of paternity is
provided to a child bom less than 300 days after its mother's husband's
death.12 Because of the difficulty of successfully implanting and giving
birth within the presumptive period, a child conceived after its father's
death will not be protected by such a presumption. 3
7. See infra Part II.B.1.
8. See infra Part II.B.2.
9. "It is doubtful that the [Louisiana] legislature contemplated situations in
which children were conceived after death of a genetic parent and the
accompanying problems with filiating because the technology of assisted
conception had not yet advanced to where it was probable that parents would
procreate after death." Ellen J. Garside, Posthumous Progeny. A Proposed
Resolution to the Dilemma of the Posthumously Conceived Child, 41 Loy. L. Rev.
713, 719 (1996). See also 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (1994) (defining "child" as
one that was dependent on the deceased or upon the relationship to the insured as
discerned by state law). See also La. Civ. Code art. 940 (to exist for purposes of
inheritance, a child must be in utero at the time of a parent's death).
10. See La. Civ. Code art. 178.
11. See La. Civ. Code art. 179. Children may be legitimated by either
subsequent marriage of parents or by a parent's execution of an authentic act. La.
Civ. Code art. 198 & 200.
12. See Unif. Parentage Act § 9B U.L.A. 377,397 (1973) (a child born within
three hundred days from the dissolution of marriage is a child of the husband).
13. In order for her child to receive the benefit of the three hundred day
presumption of paternity, the surviving spouse would have to achieve successful
2004] 615
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Illegitimate children are neither born nor conceived during
marriage.' 4 Because posthumously conceived children are born after
the death of a parent and thus outside marriage, many commentators
refer:to them as illegitimate. 5 However, although illegitimate
children are protected by the law and provided a means by which they
may assert their paternity, posthumously conceived children are not.
Louisiana provides two methods by which illegitimate children can
assert paternity: formal acknowledgment by the parent 6 or a paternity
action filed within one year of the parent's death.'7 These protections
fail to provide an effective means by which a posthumously
conceived child can assert paternity. A deceased father cannot
acknowledge his child nor is the child likely to be born in time to
assert a paternity action.
The law provides two methods by which illegitimate children can
assert paternity: the presumptions of paternity or an action within one
year of the decedent's death.' 8 However, these protections fail to
provide an effective method by which a posthumously conceived
child can assert paternity, as a child conceived after the death of its
father is unlikely to be born within the presumptive period, nor in
time to assert a paternity action.' 9
Thus, posthumously conceived children are denied rights given all
other children because they cannot be classified as either legitimate
or illegitimate under the laws of intestacy. Posthumously conceived
children are therefore not considered "children" under current legal
schemes.
implantation within days of her husband's death. This is often very difficult due to
the grieving process the surviving spouse may experience and the possible necessity
of repeated procedures before implantation will be successful.
14. See La. Civ. Code art. 180.
15. Garside, supra note 9, at 715. "Children either conceived or born during
marriage are legitimate children and children conceived and born out of marriage
are illegitimate.... Therefore, a child conceived after the death of a parent is born
out of marriage and is thus, illegitimate." Id.
16. La. Civ. Code art. 203.
17. La. Civ. Code art. 209.
18. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (1994) (defining "child" as one that was
dependent on the deceased or upon the relationship to the insured as discerned by
state law). See also Unif. Parentage Act § 4, 9B U.L.A. 377, 397 (1973) (a child
born within three hundred days from the dissolution of marriage is a child of the
husband); La. Civ. Code art. 940 (to exist, a child must be in utero at the time of a
parent's death); La. Civ. Code art. 209 (a child has one year from the death of his
father to bring a paternity action).
19. In order for her child to receive the benefit of the three hundred day
presumption of paternity, the surviving spouse would have to achieve a successful
implantation within days of her husband's death. This is often very difficult due to
the grieving process the surviving spouse may experience and the possible necessity
of repeated procedures before implantation will be successful.
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B. Legal Status to Inherit
Traditional filiation and inheritance laws deny posthumously
conceived children legal status as the children of their biological
fathers. In common law states, a posthumously conceived child may
inherit pursuant to its father's testament but is denied intestate
inheritance and other benefits. Louisiana altogether denies a
posthumously conceived child legal status as the child of its deceased
father, thus prohibiting the child from inheriting either through testacy
or intestacy.
1. Testate Inheritance
Generally, courts do not interfere with a testator's intent and will
enforce testamentary dispositions unless they are contrary to public
policy or law.2" Thus, if a posthumously conceived child was a named
beneficiary in its deceased parent's will, that child should be permitted
to inherit pursuant to the will. Where omitted from a parent's will,
posthumously conceived children may find relief in common law states
with pretermission statutes.2' Pretermission statutes are designed to
protect a child who has been left out of a parent's will, often because
the decedent failed to amend the will after the birth of a child.' It is
presumed the omission was inadvertent rather than intentional, and the
pretermission statutes correct this dilemma by providing for the omitted
child.23 Although the statutes contemplate a child born during the
lifetime of its father, it may also be reasonable to presume that the
testator would want to provide for his posthumous child, and
analogously, to his posthumously conceived child.24 In addition, that
a testator had his sperm preserved could be viewed as an indication of
intent and awareness of the possibility that a child will be
posthumously conceived.25 Under the pretermission statutes, a court
may apply the statutory presumption that the testator intends for all his
children, including those conceived and born after his death, to be
included in his will unless he clearly indicates otherwise.2 6
20. Katheleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted
Reproduction and the Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 193, 197 (1997).
21. Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent: A Dialogue on Post-Mortem
Conception, Parental Responsibilities, and Inheritance, 33 Hous. L. Rev. 967,
983-84 (1996).
22. See, e.g.,Unif. Probate Code § 2-302.
23. Id.
24. James E. Bailey, An Analytical Frameworkfor Resolving the Issues Raised
by the Interaction Between Reproductive Technology and the Law of Inheritance,
47 DePaul L. Rev. 743, 792-93 (1998).
25. Id. at 794-95.
26. Id.
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The only limitation on the common law testate transfer is that the
beneficiary must be ascertainable within the period of the Rule
against Perpetuities. The Rule against Perpetuities prohibits transfers
of property if the interest is not vested after twenty-one years from the
death of some person alive when the interest was created." Thus,
following the parent's death, if no child is posthumously conceived
within twenty-one years, pretermission statutes will no longer apply
and any inheritance rights the posthumously conceived children may
have had will be lost.
Instead ofpretermission statutes, Louisiana maintains the doctrine
of forced heirship to protect children omitted from a parent's will,
even when the omission was intentional. Nonetheless, because
posthumously conceived children do not "exist at the death of the
decedent,"" any donations made to the children are null.29  To
"exist," one must be in utero at the time of a parent's death. a If a
donation is made to one who is not in utero at the time of the
testator's death, then the donation is null and void.3' Because a
posthumously conceived child is not in utero until after the death of
its parent, it does not "exist" for purposes of inheritance.32
2. Intestate Inheritance
If a person dies without a valid will, the intestate inheritance laws
of his domiciliary state will govern the distribution of the person's
property. In order to inherit intestate, a child must be identified as
that of the father, which requires the posthumously conceived child
to qualify under a paternal presumption or to bring a timely filiation
action; both alternatives are impractical and will therefore rarely be
applied. Thus, despite an obvious biological connection to its father,
the law denies the posthumously conceived child any legal
27. John Chipman Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities 191 (4th ed. 1942).
28. La. Civ. Code art. 939. This article finds its common law equivalent in the
doctrine of'Ten veutre sa mere."
29. La. Civ. Code art. 1475. The requirement that a child be in existence at the
time of its parent's death in order to achieve legal status is further discussed infra
in Part II.B.2.
30. La. Civ. Code art. 940.
31. La. Civ. Code art. 1475.
32. See also La. R.S. 9:133 (1986). "Inheritance rights will not flow to the in
vitro fertilized ovum as a juridical person, unless the in vitro fertilized ovum
develops into an unborn child that is born in a live birth, or at any other time when
rights attach to an unborn child in accordance with law." Id. Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:133 permits inheritance rights to flow to fertilized ovum only if they
result in a live birth. La. R.S. 9:133 (1986). This statute clarifies the requirement
of "existence" by reiterating the incapability of a child conceived by artificial
insemination to inherit before birth. Id.
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association with its deceased father and consequently prevents the
child from inheriting through intestacy.
Louisiana and many other states presume that a child born within
three hundred days of a parent's death is the child of that parent.33 In
order to qualify for the presumption, the mother must achieve a
successful artificial insemination immediately following the father's
death. This is often impractical because the mother may go through
a grieving period before she is emotionally able to undergo artificial
insemination. Moreover, it may be necessary to repeat the procedure
several times before implantation is successful. Because of the
limited time it has to be born, a posthumously conceived child will
rarely qualify for recognition as the child of its biological father
pursuant to the statutory presumption of paternity.
In addition, according to Louisiana law, a child's action to
establish paternity must be brought one year following the death of
the parent. 34 Although it is possible that a child conceived after the
death of a parent may be born within the one year prescriptive period,
many children will be incapable of bringing a timely action for the
same reasons they are unable to qualify for the three hundred day
presumption of paternity.35
Louisiana's intestacy scheme,36 unlike most states, makes the very
difficult road to inheritance impossible for posthumously conceived
children. In Louisiana, even if a child is born within three hundred
days and brings an action within the one year prescriptive period, it
will be denied legal status because it did not "exist at the death of the
decedent." Thus, in Louisiana, "the posthumously conceived child
faces an irrebuttable presumption against heirship"3 because even a
33. The Uniform Parentage Act (1973) extended the common law presumption
from two hundred and eighty to three hundred days. Unif. Parentage Act § 4, 9B
U.L.A. 377, 397 (1973). Eighteen states have legislatively adopted this
presumption: Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. Although Louisiana did not
adopt the Uniform Parentage Act, it has adopted the three hundred day presumption.
La. Civ. Code art. 185.
34. La. Civ. Code art. 209.
35. Following the death of the father and before she may be ready to undergo
insemination, the mother will go through a grieving process characterized by stress
and upheaval. Even when she is ready to begin insemination, it may be necessary
to repeat the procedure several times before a successful implantation.
36. By referring to Louisiana's intestacy scheme, the author is not referring to
Louisiana's recent legislation specifically granting legal status to posthumously
conceived children. Instead, the following paragraph considers the rights of
posthumously conceived children under the state's general intestacy laws.
37. La. Civ. Code art. 939. See supra Part I. B. 1.
38. Garside, supra note 9, at 725 (citing the Amended Complaint of Nancy
2004] 619
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child capable of filing a timely action for filiation will never gain
inheritance rights due to its non-existence at the moment of its
father's death."
3. Social Security Benefits
Several of the cases addressing the issue of a posthumously
conceived child's inheritance rights have arisen in the context of the
child's eligibility for social security benefits.4 ' The Social Security
Act requires a child be dependent on the wage earner at any time prior
to his death in order to be a recipient.41 Alternatively, a child may be
entitled to benefits if it is determined that the child may inherit under
its domiciliary state's intestacy laws.42
Because the posthumously conceived child is born after the death
of its father, the child is never dependent on him as required by the
Act. Furthermore, state intestacy laws bar inheritance by a
posthumously conceived child either by disqualifying it under current
paternity and filiation statutes, or, as in Louisiana, by denying that the
child existed at the time of its father's death. 43  As a result,
posthumously conceived children are unlikely to be entitled to social
security benefits.
II. LOUISIANA'S LEGISLATION:
LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES 9:391.1
In 2001, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Revised Statutes
9:391.1, establishing broad statutory inheritance rights for
posthumously conceived children. However, in order for a
posthumously conceived child to be legally recognized as the child of
its biological father, certain conditions must be met. These
conditions will later be shown to be necessary and effective in
balancing the unique combination of interests at stake in posthumous
conception.
The Louisiana Task Force on Assisted Conception and Artificial
Means of Reproduction was the first to address the issue of
inheritance rights for posthumously conceived children in Louisiana.
It determined that a posthumously conceived child should be
recognized as the child of the deceased father and that special
Hart at 12, Hart v. Shalala, No. 94-9344 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 1993)).
39. La. Civ. Code art. 939.
40. See infra Part V.A.3-5.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (1977).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 416 (1977).
43. See La. Civ. Code art. 939.
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legislation was required to ensure such a result.44 Concerned that
genetic material would be used without the authorization of the
father, the Task Force recommended that a father express his consent
in writing that his gametes be used for the purpose of posthumous
conception and indicate his intention that the child be recognized as
his own.4' The Task Force also believed that such consent should be
terminated upon the mother's remarriage if the child is not yet
conceived. 6 Moreover, to prevent estates from being held open
indefinitely, the Task Force determined that legal recognition of the
child should only take place if the child is born within three years of
its father's death.47
The Louisiana Legislature considered the suggestions of the Task
Force and incorporated some, but not all, of its proposals. It passed
Act 479 in the 2001 Regular Session, adding Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:391.1 to the Civil Code Ancillaries." Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:391.1, as originally enacted, required that the decedent
express in writing his consent that his gametes be used by his
surviving spouse." The statute also required that the child be born
within two years of the father's death in order to be presumed the
child of the decedent. 50
In 2003, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:391.1(A) was amended
pursuant to Act 495 of the 2003 Regular Session.51 Several
significant changes were effected by the amendment. First, Act 495
eliminated the "notwithstanding" clause referencing Louisiana Civil
Code articles 179, 184, and 185. This language was replaced with the
44. Report and Recommendations of the Louisiana Task Force on Assisted
Conception and Artificial Means of Reproduction at 7-8 (2001).
45. Id. at 8.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 2001 La. Acts No. 479.
49. La. R.S. 9:391.1(A) (2001).
50. Id.
51. 2003 La. Acts. No. 495. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:391.1, as amended,
states:
A. Notwithstanding the provisions of any law to the contrary, any child
conceived after the death of a decedent, who specifically authorized in
writing his surviving spouse to use his gametes, shall be deemed the child
of such decedent with all rights, including the capacity to inherit from the
decedent, as the child would have had if the child had been in existence at
the time of the death of the deceased parent, provided the child was born
to the surviving spouse, using the gametes of the decedent, within three
years of the death of the decedent.
B. Any heir or legatee of the decedent whose interest in the succession of
the decedent will be reduced by the birth of a child conceived as provided
in Subsection A of this Section shall have one year from the birth of such
child within which to bring an action to disavow paternity.
La. R.S. 9:391.1 (2004).
2004]
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phrase "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of any law," thus giving the
statute pervasive effect over any contrary law as opposed to a few
specific articles. Second, the amendment omitted the classification
of posthumously conceived children as "legitimate," instead
recognizing the posthumously conceived child as a "child." Next,
the Act added the following clause: "with all rights, including the
capacity to inherit from the decedent, as the child would have if the
child had been in existence at the time of the death of the deceased
parent." These changes clarify the intended effect of the statute. As
stated in the Digest to the Act, the rights of the posthumously
conceived child, particularly its capacity to inherit, are explicitly
stated rather than merely presumed by the child's classification as
"legitimate." Finally, the amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:931.1 altered the time limitation within which the child must be
born following the parent's death. Prior to the enactment, Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:931.1 limited its beneficial presumption of legal
status to children born within two years of the decedent's death. Act
495 has expanded that period to three years.
"1". COMPETING POLICIES IN POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION
Posthumous conception creates a unique competition between
state and personal interests. In determining how best to resolve the
problems faced by posthumously conceived children, a legislature
must examine and attempt to balance the conflicting legal interests of
the state, the child, and the decedent.5 2 Traditional filiation and
inheritance laws consider only the state's interests, while the interests
of the child and the deceased father are ignored. Nonetheless, to
grant posthumously conceived children unrestricted legal status
would be to disregard the state's interests. The interests of all
involved must be sufficiently addressed in order to achieve fair and
effective legislation.
A. State Interests
The state's interest in stable land titles and the orderly distribution
of property after death must be considered.53 Various other state
interests, such as the protection of the psychological well-being of the
resulting child and the prevention of public dependency must also be
weighed against the individual's interest in reproducing after death,
52. See, e.g., Garside, supra note 9, at 730; Anne Reichnian Schiff, Arising
from the Dead. Challenges of Posthumous Procreation, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 901, 904
(1997).
53. Garside, supra note 9, at 730.
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and the child's interests in parental support and proving filiation.
Although each of the state's interests is important, it is improbable
that one or all justify barring inheritance rights from posthumously
conceived children, particularly if they interfere with the fundamental
right to procreate or the constitutional rights of the child.
1. Timely Disposition of Estates
Posthumous conception creates the possibility that a child will
make a claim against the decedent's estate years after his death. If the
estate is already closed, beneficiaries and legatees may be
subsequently liable. The Supreme Court has recognized that orderly
disposition of property at death is a valid governmental purpose. 4 In
part to protect this state interest, the Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception Act (USCACA) found it necessary to deny
inheritance rights to posthumously conceived children altogether.
In contrast, the Massachusetts Superior Judicial Court in Woodward
v. Commissioner of Social Security 6 found that these interests were
served by state intestacy statutes that require proof of filiation and
establish time limitations on actions against an estate.
5 7
As recognized in Woodward, the timely disposition of estates,
though an important governmental interest, can be adequately
addressed without precluding legal status to posthumously conceived
children. Requiring a limited time period within which a
posthumously conceived child may bring an action against the estate
effectively addresses the state's interest without imposing overly
harsh restrictions on posthumously conceived children's ability to
inherit. Thus, had the USCACA merely limited the time following
the parent's death in which a child may assert inheritance rights,
rather than limiting the rights themselves, it would have protected
both the interests of the state and the posthumously conceived child.
54. Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 106 S. Ct. 2234 (1986).
[T]he state interest in the orderly disposition of decedent's estates may
justify the imposition of special requirements upon an illegitimate child
who asserts a right to inherit from her father, and of course, it justifies the
enforcement of generally applicable limitations on the time and the manner
in which claims may be asserted. After an estate has been finally
distributed, the interest in finality may provide an additional, valid
justification for barring the belated assertion of claims, even though they
may be meritorious.
476 U.S. at 855, 106 S. Ct. at 2237.
55. Unif. Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, 9C U.L.A. 363
(1988).
56. 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002). See infra Part V.A.5.
57. 760 N.E.2d at 270.
2004]
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2. Welfare of the Child
The state has an interest in the welfare of the child, particularly its
psychological well-being."8 The state may be concerned that a
posthumously conceived child will suffer psychological damage when
the circumstances of its conception are discovered. In addition, the
child may be adversely affected if it is raised in a fatherless home.
On the other hand, psychological harm to a posthumously conceived
child may be no greater than the harm to a child whose father dies
before it is born, or a child whose father dies while it is still young.
In fact, posthumously conceived children may have an advantage that
other fatherless children do not: the knowledge that they were the
fulfillment of their father's wish. 9 Furthermore, by forbidding
posthumously conceived children from inheriting from their fathers,
the state would not serve its interest in the welfare of posthumously
conceived children at all. Rather, limiting their support can only
compound the harm they suffer.
These competing notions of the posthumously conceived child's
welfare are only speculation. Until the state can show actual harm to
a posthumously conceived child, its interest in the child's welfare
ought not be sufficient to deny it legal status. Even if the state had an
actual interest in the well-being of a posthumously conceived child,
the state's concerns could only be effectively addressed by prohibiting
posthumous conception altogether, an action that may violate the
decedent's interest.60
3. Public Dependency
Another concern of the state is that a posthumously conceived
child may become a public dependant. Ordinarily, an individual who
contemplates having children is limited in his decision by the
financial obligation to rear those children. However, economic
restraints affecting procreative decisions become less important with
the knowledge that death is imminent and someone else will face the
responsibility of supporting the child. Therefore, it is arguable that
allowing posthumous reproduction encourages single-parent support
and possible public dependency of posthumously conceived children.
However, while the natural economic restraints involved in
58. The state may also be concerned as to the health of a child conceived from
sperm that has been stored for many years. However, healthy children have been
born from sperm that was frozen for over ten years. E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene
Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of Post-Mortem Insemination,
1 J.L. & Health 229, 234 (1996).
59. Chester, supra note 21, at 1022.
60. See infra Part III.B.
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procreative choices no longer affect the deceased father, these
restraints are still faced by the mother. It can therefore be assumed
that the cost of rearing a child on her own is a factor the mother will
consider before undergoing artificial insemination.6'
Ironically, by prohibiting the posthumously conceived child from
inheriting, the state actually makes it more likely that it will become
a public dependant. If a posthumously conceived child was
recognized as a "child" under the law and given appropriate legal
status, the possibility of its becoming a public dependant would be
diminished by the financial support it would receive from the father's
estate or that of his family, in addition to benefits from insurance and
social security.
B. Decedent's Interests
The decedent's interests must also be taken into account. Even
after death, it can be argued that the autonomy interests of an
individual do not entirely dissipate and can be "posthumously
harmed" by the conduct of the surviving parties. Posthumous harm
occurs when the decedent's autonomy interest is infringed by the
disregard of his intent.63 To prevent the deceased from becoming a
biological parent when that is his intention, or to make him a
biological parent when it is against his wishes, may constitute a harm
to the deceased's interests because it violates his right to make
procreative decisions.'
The United States Supreme Court has firmly established a right
to procreate and a right to make procreative decisions."' Although the
61. The argument that single parent income increases the possibility of public
dependency is also contrary to the traditional recognition of families in which the
husband is the only breadwinner.
62. Schiff, supra note 52, at 935-42 (citing Joel Feinberg, Harm and Self-
Interest, in Law, Morality and Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart 285,
299-308 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977); Joel Feinberg, The Rights of
Animals and Unborn Generations, in Philosophy and Environmental Crisis 43,
57-60 (William T. Blackstone ed., 1974)). Butsee John A. Robertson, Posthumous
Reproduction, 69 Ind. L. J. 1027 (1994) (respect for autonomy alone cannot
determine the importance of posthumous conception).
63. Schiff, supra note 52, at 935-42.
64. Id. at 942-43 (arguing that to inflict parenthood on someone after death,
when that is not his desire, infringes upon his autonomy). See also Parpalaix c.
Centre d'Etude et de Conservation des Oeufs et du Sperme humains, Trib. Gr. Inst.
Creteil, Aug. 1, 1984, Gaz. Pal. (1984) at 11 (found a constitutional right to
procreate that permitted posthumous conception to occur); Hecht v. Superior Court,
20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 289 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d 1993) (finding a constitutional right to
procreate that continues after death). See infra Part V.A. 1-2.
65. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S. Ct. 1110 (1942) (Court found
procreation to be one of the basic civil rights of man); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
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Court found these rights where technology was used to prevent the
conception of a child, ' the Court has not yet decided whether the right
to privacy includes a right for individuals to use technology to conceive
a child; nor if the right extends beyond death. However, one may argue
that these cases could be extended by analogy to protect the right to
make procreative choices the effect of which will not take place until
after death.67 As one commentator pointed out, because present law
protects the decedent's wishes regarding organ donation and disposition
of property, "[i]t would be ironic indeed if the law... ignore[d] pre-
mortem wishes concerning a matter as central to a person's identity as
the desire.., to create another human being."'68 If the decedent has a
right to procreate that extends beyond death, the state will be prohibited
from forbidding a surviving spouse the use of her husband's sperm to
reproduce. Nonetheless, a post-mortem procreative right is theoretical
at best. Unless the Court identifies such a right, the decedent's interest
will not ensure inheritance by a posthumously conceived child.
C. Child's Interests
Even if the decedent does not have a right to procreate after his
death, the posthumously conceived child's interests prevent a
legislature from prohibiting its right to inherit. A child has both a right
to financial support by its parents' and a right to prove paternity.
These rights prevent a legislature from altogether barring a
posthumously conceived child from the opportunity to attain legal
status. They also require the child be afforded some means to establish
paternity in the deceased father.
U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029
(1972); Carey v. Population Servs., 431 U.S. 678,97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977). Through
these cases, the Supreme Court cemented a fundamental right to make procreative
choices when technology was used to prevent the conception of a child. See Karin
Mika & Bonnie Hurst, One Way to be Born? Legislative Inaction and the
Posthumous Child, 79 Marq. L. Rev. 993, 1001-08 (1996).
66. Id.
67. Janet J. Berry, Life After Death: Preservation of the Immortal Seed, 72
Tul. L. Rev. 231, 235 (1997). Berry also notes the American Fertility Society
declared that ."[i]t is understood that the gametes and concepti are the property of
the donors. The donors therefore have the right to decide at their sole discretion the
disposition of these items. ... "' Id. at 241 (citing Ethics Comm'n of the American
Fertility Soc'y, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies, 46
Fertility & Sterility 89 (1986)). In addition, the courts in Parpalaix v. CECOS and
Hecht v. Superior Court agree that the decedent has a fundamental right to
procreate after death. Paraplaix, Trib. Gr. Inst. Creteil, Aug. 1, 1984, Gaz. Pal.
(1984); Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275. See infra V.A.1-2.
68. Schiff, supra note 52, at 943.
69. La. Civ. Code art. 227. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13, 101 S. Ct. 2202,
2209 (1981).
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Historically, an illegitimate child was labeled "filius nullius"-the
child of no one.70 Illegitimate children lacked the capacity to inherit
from or through either parent. By determining that it was
unconstitutional to deny children rights based upon their birth, the
Supreme Court held that "illogical and unjust" legislation7' that
created an impenetrable barrier to the assertion of the children's
inheritance rights violated the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.72 Today, states offer illegitimate children the ability to prove
paternity and to inherit from both of their parents.73
The situation once faced by illegitimate children is directly
analogous to the legal deprivation of inheritance rights of
posthumously conceived children. Due to the similarity of the
situations and the "illogical and unjust" barrier faced by
posthumously conceived children who wish to be legally recognized
as their fathers' child, the Court should analyze these cases under the
standard by which the barriers against illegitimate children were
analyzed.
States prohibiting inheritance by posthumously conceived
children, or even states that merely imply this result by continuing to
analyze the rights of posthumously conceived children according to
traditional filiation law, violate the Equal Protection Clause.74 Denial
of inheritance rights to posthumously conceived children, merely
because they were conceived at a time and by a means that most
children are not, is classification based upon birth. Furthermore, to
make the children suffer when they had no responsibility in the
circumstances of their births, is "illogical and unjust." Therefore,
posthumously conceived children, like illegitimate children, should
be afforded an opportunity in which to assert paternity and gain legal
status.
Even so, the Supreme Court has held that intestacy laws that do
not absolutely block children's inheritance rights are constitutional if
they bear a substantial relationship to an important government
objective.75 Because some posthumously conceived children maybe
70. David Line Batty, Michael H. v. Gerald D.: The Constitutional Rights of
Putative Fathers and a Proposal of Reform, 31 B.C. L. Rev. 1173, 1176 (1990)
(citing 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 458-59).
71. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769,97 S. Ct. 1459, 1465 (1977) (held
a state statute unconstitutional because it only allowed illegitimate children to
inherit by intestate succession from their mothers).
72. Id. at 773, 97 S. Ct. At 1465.
73. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-114, 8 U.L.A. 91 (1998).
74. Garside, supra note 9, at 722. Chester, supra note 21, at 990 (explains that
such a statutory scheme would present illegitimate children with an impenetrable
barrier to the assertion of their inheritance rights which was prohibited by the
Supreme Court in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 97 S. Ct. 1459).
75. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 503-05, 96 S. Ct. 2755,2761-62 (1976)
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bom within the small window permitted by the three hundred day
presumption,7 6 the Court may find that posthumously conceived
children are not presented with an "impenetrable barrier."
Nonetheless, because the classification excludes "at least some
significant categories of illegitimate children of intestate men [whose]
inheritance rights can be recognized withoutj eopardizing the orderly
settlement of estates""7 or any other governmental interest, such
intestacy laws will violate equal protection.7"
In addition to granting legal status, legislatures must provide an
adequate time period within which posthumously conceived children
may assert their rights. In Mills v. Habluetzel,79 the United States
Supreme Court found that a Texas statute denied equal protection to
illegitimate children by requiring them to bring a filiation action
within one year. The Court recognized that "[b]y granting
illegitimate children only one year in which to establish paternity,
Texas has failed to provide them with an adequate opportunity to gain
support. 80 In addition, the Supreme Court in Clark v. Jete?' found
a six year statute of limitations on paternity actions did not
satisfactorily provide illegitimate children with an opportunity to
obtain support. The Court found the limitation violated the Equal
Protection Clause after determining that the limitation must provide
a child with a reasonable opportunity to assert a claim."2
Due to the similarity between the past treatment of illegitimate
children and the present treatment of posthumously conceived
children, legislation that limits the ability of the posthumously
conceived child to inherit or provides only a short time for the child
to bring an action for legal status, will violate the Equal Protection
Clause. It is unlikely that the Court will find the neglect or
discrimination of posthumously conceived children substantially
related to the accomplishment of any government objective.83 Thus,
although the state's interests in the timely disposition of estates and
(established this "intermediate" standard for children classified by birth).
76. The court may also consider that in some states, a posthumously conceived
child may inherit if listed as a beneficiary in its father's will.
77. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 774, 97 S. Ct. at 1467.
78. See Part IV.A.1.
79. 456 U.S. 91, 102 S. Ct. 1549 (1982).
80. Id. at 100, 102 S. Ct. at 1555.
81. 486 U.S. 456, 463, 108 S. Ct. 1910, 1919 (1988).
82. Id.
83. The court may also find such legislative schemes unconstitutional because
of the availability of less restrictive alternatives. For example, the governmental
end of timely disposition is adequately satisfied by statutes of limitations on
paternity actions. Similarly, the governmental end of final determination of
paternity is inadequate justification because posthumously conceived children can
easily prove a biological connection with their fathers.
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the child's welfare are important, equal protection will require that some
means be given to a posthumously conceived child to assert its legal
status.
D. The Balance of Competing Interests in Louisiana's Legislation
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:391.1 simultaneously balances the
rights of the state, decedent, and child. The child is given inheritance
rights, subject only to conditions that prevent infringement on the rights
of the decedent and state. The three year limitation, within which a child
must be born to attain legal status, is much less restrictive than the
former one year statute of limitations for paternity actions because it
offers posthumously conceived children a more realistic opportunity to
assert gatemity and reduces interference with the parents' procreative
rights. A lesser period is impractical due to a number of factors such
as the mother's grieving period, the probability of repeated attempts at
implantation," the gestational period, and the recovery time immediately
following. The three year period also serves the state's interest in the
timely disposition of estates, for it is not unusual for estates to take longer
than three years to settle. A period greater than three years could have
severe consequences on the stability of settled estates. In addition, the
three year limitation may deter a widow considering posthumous
conception from attempting conception after the time limitation,
consequently serving the state's interest in protecting the welfare of a
child whose health may be placed in jeopardy by extended storage.
Thus, Louisiana's legislation reasonably balances the child's right to
paternity and support, the decedent's autonomy interest, and the state's
interests in timely disposition of estates and child welfare.
IV. COMPARISON TO OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. Jurisprudence
The first cases addressing posthumous conception did so indirectly
by addressing the donor's ability to bequeath his sperm and the public
policy surrounding posthumous conception. These cases did not
determine whether a posthumously conceived child may inherit from its
biological father. More recently, courts have directly addressed intestate
inheritance by posthumously conceived children with conflicting results.
84. Chester, supra note 21, at 995-96.
85. There is only a twenty-two to twenty-seven percent success rate of artificial
insemination per month. American Society for Reproductive Medicine available
at http://www.asrm.org./Patients/FactSheets/Infertility. In addition, the gestational
period takes nine months.
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1. Parpalaix c. Centres d'Etude et de Conservation des Ouefs
et du Sperme humains
The issue of whether posthumously conceived children are the
legal heirs of their deceased fathers was first addressed in France in
Parpalaix c.Centres d'Etude et de Conservation des Ouefs et du
Sperme humains8 6 (CECOS). The case received international
attention and appears to have greatly influenced courts in the United
States as they attempt to understand and address posthumous
conception."
Alain Parpalaix was diagnosed with testicular cancer.88
Concerned that the recommended chemotherapy would cause sterility,
he deposited his sperm in a government sperm bank without
demonstrating his intent for the sperm in the event of death.89 Faced
with imminent death, Alain married his girlfriend just two days
before he died.90 After his death, Alain's widow sought his sperm
for her use in artificial insemination.9'
The French court acknowledged the difficulties of the country's
outdated laws and only inquired as to Alain's intent based upon the
fundamental right to procreate. 92 In the absence of Alain's written
intent, the court found that Alain's wife and parents were in the best
position to articulate his intentions for the frozen sperm and ordered
CECOS give the sperm to Alain's widow. 93 Nonetheless, it noted in
dicta that any child consequently born would be prohibited from
inheriting from its father.94 Thus, even though the court found that
the fundamental right to procreate survived death, a child
86. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 58, at 229, n. 4 (citing Trib. Gr. Inst.
Creteil, Aug. 1, 1984, Gaz. Pal. (1984) at 11). CECOS is the Center for the Study
and Conservation of Sperm, a government run sperm bank in Paris. Id. at 229.
87. See e.g., Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal Ct. App. 2d
1993).
88. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 58, at 229.
89. Id. at 229-30.
90. Id. at 230.
91. Id. Alain's widow argued she was entitled to the sperm as natural heir
under contract law. She also argued that although it was not expressly written,
Alain intended her to use the sperm to conceive a child after his death. Id. at
230-31.
92. Id. at 232. The court dismissed the contract theory and reasoned that the
"fate of the sperm must be decided by the person from whom it is drawn." Id.
93. Id. at 232-33.
94. Id. at 231. According to the French Civil Code, any child born more than
three hundred days after the death of the mother's husband is not presumed to be
child of the husband. Id. at 231 (citing C. civ. art. 315). Even if the child should
qualify for the presumption of paternity, the child would be barred from inheriting
from its father because the child must exist at the time of death in order to have
capacity to inherit either testate or intestate. Id. at 231-32.
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posthumously conceived and born pursuant to that fundamental right
would not be legally recognized as the child of its biological father."
2. Hecht v. Superior Court
In Hecht v. Superior Court,96 California became the first state to
address whether artificial insemination may be used to achieve
posthumous conception.
The decedent, William Kane, was a divorcee with two children.97
He cohabitated with Deborah Hecht for the five years preceding his
suicide.98 Upon Kane's decision to end his life, he deposited his
sperm with a sperm bank, intending that Hecht use the sperm after his
death to produce a child.99 This intent was manifested by his
testamentary donation of the sperm to Hecht for her use, written
authorization at the sperm bank to release the sperm to Hecht, and a
letter to his children stating that he hoped Hecht would have a child
after his death.'0' When Hecht sought control of the sperm in order
to attempt conception, Kane's children filed a will contest seeking
destruction of the sperm.'
The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision
that ordered the destruction of Kane's sperm. The appellate court
found that it was not against public policy to allow an unmarried
woman to undergo artificial insemination using a dead man's sperm
and that the fundamental right to procreate overrode any possible
psychological harm to existing children.'0 2 The court acknowledged
Kane's intent to have children posthumously and concluded that
"assuming that both Hecht and decedent desired to conceive a child
using decedent's sperm, real parties fail to establish a state interest
sufficient to justify interference with that decision.' ' 03 Accordingly,
the court awarded Hecht the decedent's sperm.'0 4 However, as in
Parpalaix, the California court noted in dicta that a child conceived
95. As a result of this decision, the French government enacted a law that
prohibited posthumous insemination, as well as assisted conception used for non-
medical reasons, homosexuals, or unattached women. Gilbert, supra note 2, at
559-60 (citing C. San. Pub. arts. L. 152-1 to-10). The government believed that
such uses of artificial insemination would strain social resources and discourage the
traditional nuclear family. Id.
96. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d 1993).
97. Id. at 276.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 276-77.
101. Id. at278.
102. Id. at 289.
103. Id. at 283.
104. Id. at 291.
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from the artificially preserved sperm would probably be prohibited
from inheriting from Kane's estate under California intestacy law.'°5
3. Hart v. Shalala
In Hart v. Shalala,0 6 the Social Security Administration
questioned whether posthumously conceived children could inherit
under Louisiana's intestacy laws. The case concerned a
posthumously conceived child, Judith, who was born more than three
hundred days after her father's death and was thus prohibited
recognition as her biological father's child under the presumption of
paternity.0 7 In addition, her action for filiation prescribed when she
was ten days old.'
Relying on the Social Security Act, as well as Louisiana's
intestate and filiation law, the Social Security Administration denied
Judith's claims to benefits, finding that a posthumously conceived
child did not qualify under the Social Security Act and that the child
was not legitimate for purposes of intestate succession."° Following
that determination, Judith's mother sued the Social Security
Administration."0 An administrative law judge consequently found
that Edward was Judith's legitimate father, entitling her to Social
Security benefits."' The ALJ held that the law violated equal
protection, resting his decision on the Supreme Court's prior finding
that one year was not sufficient to give a reasonable opportunity for
those with an interest in a child to assert claims on the child's behalf.
The Social Security Appeals Council ignored the equal protection
concerns and overturned the decision of the AL. It found that Judith
was not a legitimate child because she did not "exist" at the time of
her father's death.' 2 The mother appealed to Federal District Court,
but prior to the appellate hearing, the Social Security Administration
reversed its position in order to avoid a test-case on the constitutional
105. Id. at 290. The California probate law in effect during Hecht permitted an
illegitimate child to establish paternity after the alleged father's death only if a court
order had been entered during the father's life or the father had openly held out the
child as his own. This law has since been repealed and replaced. For a discussion
on the change and its implications concerning posthumously conceived children see
Chester, supra note 21, at 986.
106. No. 94-3944 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 1993).
107. Original Complaint ofNancy Hart at 3, Hart v. Shalala, No. 94-3944 (E.D.
La. Dec. 12, 1993).
108. Garside, supra note 9, at 721.
109. Original Complaint of Nancy Hart, supra note 107,at 6.
110. Id.
111. Judith C. Hart at 6 (determination of Soc. Sec. Admin. March 27, 1995).
112. Guzman, supra note 20, at 227, N. 118 (citing Joseph Wharton, 'Miracle'
Baby Denied Benefits, 82 A.B.A. J. 38, 38 (Feb. 1996)).
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issues raised." 3  Judith Hart was thus granted Social Security
benefits, but the issue of whether Judith could properly inherit under
Louisiana intestacy law was never settled.
4. In re Estate of William J. Kolacy
The next case to address the issue of legal status and inheritance
was In re Estate of William J. Kolacy, " where New Jersey faced the
issue of whether twin girls born eighteen months after the death of
their father were entitled to Social Security benefits." 5 After
Kolacy's death from leukemia, his wife conceived the twins from
sperm Kolacy deposited before undergoing chemotherapy."6
Kolacy's wife sought Social Security benefits for the children, but the
Administration denied the claim, finding that under New Jersey's
intestacy law, only children conceived before their father's death can
inherit."'I The twins' mother then filed a claim in the New Jersey
state courts, arguing that her daughters should be declared capable of
inheriting under intestate law."'
Noting the lack of guidance on the issue, the Court reasoned that
the children were entitled to be recognized as the heirs of their
father" 9 because of the general legislative intent that children
"should be amply provided for" in the event of their father's death.' 0
According to the Court, this intent in favor of children should prevail
over a "restricted, literal reading" of the statute.' 2' In a very result-
oriented decision, the Court applied an equitable solution and
permitted the posthumously conceived children to inherit from their
biological father.'
5. Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security
In Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security,2 3 the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was asked by the U.S. District
Court of Massachusetts whether a posthumously conceived child
113. Id. at 228, n. 126 (citing Joseph Wharton, Social Security Case Settled, 82
A.B.A. J. 40, 40 (May 1996)).
114. 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
115. Id. at 1258.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1259-60.
118. Id. at 1259.
119. Id. at 1260.
120. Id. at 1262.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002).
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conceived child enjoyed inheritance rights under Massachusetts
intestacy law for purposes of attaining Social Security benefits.2 4
Upon discovering that he had leukemia, Warren Woodward deposited
his sperm with the hope that he and his wife could use it in the future
whether or not he survived. 12 Warren died in October of 1993, and
in February 1995, his wife was successfully inseminated with
Warren's preserved sperm. 2 6 Approximately two years after their
father's death, Warren's wife gave birth to twin girls. 7 The Social
Security Administration (SSA) rejected the mother's claims for
benefits, for she had not established that the twins were her husband's
"children" within the meaning of the Act and because the children
could not inherit under Massachusetts intestacy law.' 28 The twins'
mother pursued her claim in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, which certified the question to the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court because no Massachusetts
precedent existed. 21
In addressing the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived
children, the Massachusetts Supreme Court emphasized that its role
was to "balance and harmonize" the competing interests of the child,
the state, and the deceased to "effect the Legislature's over-all
purposes.' ' 30  The Court noted the statutory and jurisprudential
concern that all children should enjoy the same rights, regardless of
the circumstances of their births.'' The Court also identified the
legislative policies favoring parental support of children, avoidance
of public dependence, and support of assisted reproductive
technologies."' Based on these legislative and jurisprudential
protections of children, the court believed it would be irrational for
the legislature to deny rights and protections to posthumously
conceived children. 33 The court believed the decedent's interests
must be protected by requiring the surviving parent to demonstrate
the decedent affirmatively consented to posthumous conception and
the support of any resulting child in order for the child to qualify as
a legal heir of the deceased father. 134
124. Id. at 259-60.
125. Id. at 260.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 260-61.
129. Id. at 261.
130. Id. at 265.
131. Id. ("Repeatedly, forcefully, and unequivocally, the Legislature has
expressed its will that all children be entitled to the same rights and protections of
the law regardless of the accidents of their birth.").
132. Id.
133. Id. at 265-67.
134. Id. at 270.
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Thus, as in Kolacy, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ignored
existing paternity and inheritance law, focusing instead on reaching
an equitous outcome for posthumously conceived children. However,
unlike Kolacy, the Court also protected the interests of the decedent
and permitted benefits to be given to the children only if the decedent
consented to their birth. 135
6. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart
In Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart,136 the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona was called upon to determine whether
posthumously conceived twins may inherit under Arizona intestacy
law for purposes of qualifying for Social Security survivor benefits
and whether an administrative law judge's interpretation of Arizona
intestacy law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution.
Juliet and Piers were conceived ten months after their father's
death from sperm he deposited before undergoing chemotherapy. 37
On behalf of Juliet and Piers, their mother, Rhonda, sought Social
Security benefits for the children as survivors of her husband. After
being denied relief by the Social Security Administration, an
administrative law judge, and the Appeals Council, Rhonda sought
judicial review in federal district court. 3
The district court found that because Arizona requires an heir be
in existence at the time of the decedent's death, Juliet and Piers were
not "children" for purposes of the Social Security Act. 39 Although
Arizona provides an exception if a child is in gestation at the time of
the father's death, because Juliet and Piers were neither born nor in
gestation at the time of their father's death, they could not inherit
from him under Arizona intestacy law.'4°
The district court also rejected the children's equal protection
claim.'41 The court believed that Juliet and Piers were not
discriminated against due to the circumstances of their births, but
instead based upon the timing of their births.'42 The court did not
believe such discrimination involved a fundamental right or any
suspect class and was therefore not subject to heightened scrutiny.'3
135. Id.
136. 231 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz. 2002).
137. Id. at 963.
138. Id. at 964.
139. Id. at 966.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 970.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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The court believed that the Social Security Administration acted
rationally by conditioning benefits on the applicability of state
intestacy laws.' It distinguished Supreme Court equal protection
decisions involving illegitimate children on the grounds that none
addressed children conceived after the death of a parent.145
In so holding, the district court was not influenced by the
Woodward and Kolacy decisions, finding Woodward distinguishable
and Kolacy unpersuasive. 146 Unlike the courts in Woodward and
Kolacy, the district court interpreted Arizona intestacy law and
Supreme Court precedent on equal protection literally, without
reflection on equity or the law's purpose.
147
B. Legislation
Like Louisiana, other states have enacted legislation directly
addressing the issue of posthumous conception. Instead of granting
posthumously conceived children greater inheritance rights, most
states either expressly deny them rights, or create very narrow
exceptions which will rarely apply. Others meritoriously permit a
broad class of posthumously conceived children to inherit but in
doing so ignore certain imperative interests.
1. The Uniform Acts
The first legislative effort in the United States to address
posthumous conception was within the Uniform Status of Children
of Assisted Conception Act (USCACA). 148 The USCACA favored
state interests by providing that "an individual who dies before
implantation of an embryo, or before a child is conceived other than
through sexual intercourse, using the individual's egg or sperm, is not
a parent of the resulting child.",r49 The USCACA absolutely barred
posthumously conceived children from establishing legal status. Not
only did the Act ignore the best interests of the child, but it also
disregarded the parent's intent and right to procreate. 50
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 967-69.
147. Id.
148. Unif. Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, 9C U.L.A. 363
(1988). The USCACA was only adopted by North Dakota and Virginia. North
Dakota's version is identical to the USCACA. See N.D. Cent Code § 14-18-01 to
07 (1989). Virginia's legislation applies two exceptions to the USCACA. Va.
Code § 20-156 to 165 (Michie 1995).
149. Unif. Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act § 4, 9C U.L.A. 371
(1988).
150. Gibbons, supra note 2, at 207.
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In 2000, the USCACA was repealed and recodified in the
Uniform Parentage Act (UPA)."' Already, Texas and Washington
have adopted the UPA and its provision relating to the legal status of
posthumously conceived children. 5 2 The UPA provision follows the
general rule of the USCACA and declares posthumously conceived
children are not the children of the deceased parent. However, the
UPA provides an exception where the decedent consented in a writing
that any child born by assisted reproduction after his death is his
child. With such written acknowledgment, the deceased parent will
be recognized as the father of the posthumously conceived child, and
the child will be allowed to inherit from its father. 53
The UPA improves upon the USCACA by acknowledging
parental intent and by creating circumstances in which the
posthumously conceived child will be granted legal status. However,
the Act is flawed in that it does not limit the time within which the
child must be born in order to qualify for inheritance. By broadly
granting posthumously conceived children legal status, conditioned
only on the consent of the deceased parent, the UPA potentially
permits the disruption of the decedent's estate many years after his
death. 54
2. Virginia
Virginia adopted a version of the USCACA with certain
modifications.'55 Virginia's statute allows a posthumously conceived
child to obtain legal status as the decedent's child if the "the person
consents to be a parent in writing before the implantation."' 56
However, there are severe restrictions upon this general provision. In
order for the decedent to be a parent, the decedent must die prior to
"implantation [but] before notice of the death can reasonably be
151. Uniform Parentage Act § 707, 9B U.L.A. 295, 358 (2000) ("If a spouse
dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased spouse is not a
parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented in a record that
if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased spouse would be a
parent of the child.").
152. Tex. Farn. Code Ann. § 160.707 (Vernon 2002); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
26.26.730 (West. Supp. 2002).
153. Uniform Parentage Act §707, 9B U.L.A. 295, 358 (2000).
154. "This section is designed primarily to avoid the problems of intestate
succession which could arise if the posthumous use of a person's genetic material
could lead to the deceased being determined to be a parent." Id. at 359 (cmt.). The
UPA purportedly attempts to discourage the disruption of estates; however, by
excluding a time within which the child must be born, it fails to consider an action
against the estate years after its closure.
155. Va. Code Ann. § 20-156 to 165 (Michie 1995).
156. Va. Code Ann. § 20-158 (B) (Michie 1995).
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communicated to the physician performing the procedure."' 57 The
decedent must also have expressed his consent in writing. Even if
these conditions are met, unless the child is born to married parents
within ten months of the parent's death, the child will not be entitled
to intestate inheritance rights. 58Thus, although the Virginia legislature appeared to offer
posthumously conceived children an opportunity to inherit, the
opportunities presented are exceedingly narrow and restrictive. The
first condition for legal status is achieved only if the father
unexpectedly dies just as the mother is preparing to undergo or has
begun artificial insemination and before the doctor performing the.
procedure can be notified. Such a situation is highly improbable and
could only apply to an extremely narrow class of children, if any. The
added requirements that the child be born within ten months of the
father's death and that the parents of the child be married, mimics the
traditional presumption ofpaternity. By reasserting the three hundred
day presumption, the opportunity for a posthumously conceived child
to be born within the time limitation is severely restricted. Thus,
although the Virginia legislation appears to have provided
posthumously conceived children with the possibility of inheriting,
in reality, it is almost impossible for them to do so.
3. Florida
Florida's statute provides that "[a] child conceived from the eggs
or sperm of a person or persons who died before the transfer of their
eggs, sperm, or pre-embryos to a woman's body shall not be eligible
for a claim against the decedent's estate unless the child has been
provided for by the decedent's will."' 59 This statute does not change
the law. As discussed previously, common law states likely permit
testate inheritance by posthumously conceived children through
pretermission statutes. Therefore, by limiting inheritance of
posthumously conceived children to merely testate inheritance,
Florida has codified the status quo and effected no substantive
changes in the rights of posthumously conceived children.
C. Louisiana Compared
North Dakota, Virginia, and Florida inadequately address
posthumous conception and in doing so, violate the Equal Protection
Clause. Although the UPA, as enacted by Texas and Washington, is
157. Id.
158. Va. Code Ann. §20-158 and 164 (Michie 1995).
159. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 742.17(4) (West 1997).
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much more progressive as to the rights and necessary protections of
the posthumously conceived child, it neglects the state's interest in
the timely disposition of estates.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:391.1 fills the gaps left by other
legislative attempts by simultaneously protecting the interests of the
state, the decedent, and the child. The child is given inheritance
rights, subject only to conditions necessary to protect the interests of
the state and the decedent. Like the UPA, Revised Statutes 9:391.1
protects the decedent's intent byrequiring written consent. Louisiana
also protects the state's interests in the timely distribution of estates
by requiring the child be born within three years of its father's death
in order to attain legal status. Unlike Virginia and Florida, Louisiana
does not unnecessarily and severely limit the posthumously conceived
children that may inherit from their biological fathers. Thus,
Louisiana has provided the most balanced and effective legislation on
the legal status of posthumously conceived children by granting legal
status to as many children as possible without harshly infringing upon
the interests of the state or the decedent.
V. PROBLEMS UNADDRESSED BY 9:391.1160
Despite its effective and balanced protection of posthumously
conceived children, Louisiana's legislation is not without flaws.
There are still several concerns created by posthumous conception
that have yet to be or were inadequately addressed by Louisiana's
legislature.
A. Unmarried Couples
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:391.1 applies only to married
couples. The emphasis on marriage as a prerequisite to a
posthumously conceived child's ability to inherit is demonstrated by
the statute's requirement that the child be born to the surviving
spouse and that consent by the decedent authorize the surviving
160. One problem that is beyond the scope of this comment is "sperm
harvesting," which occurs when family members order sperm be extracted from a
decedent's body and frozen. "Harvesting" often occurs in conjunction with an
unexpected and untimely death. If the deceased's interests are to be adequately
safeguarded, a high standard of evidence of the intent to reproduce after death
should be required in order to prevent family members from applying their own
wants or values rather than attempting to ascertain the desire of the decedent.
Disregarding an individual's objections to posthumous procreation can constitute
a significant harm to the interests of that deceased person and cannot be justified by
reference to the procreative interests of the living. See e.g., Schiff, supra note 52,
at 945-949; Berry, supra note 67, at 248-250.
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spouse to use his gametes.'' However, post-mortem insemination is
not prohibited to unmarried individuals. Both married and unmarried
women may conceive children posthumously, but those born after the
death of an unmarried parent are forbidden any right to inherit from
that parent. The Task Force recommended that posthumously
conceived children born to unmarried partners also receive legal
status. 62  In disregarding the Task Force's suggestion, the
legislature's intent may have been to discourage non-marital relations
or non-marital insemination. If the Louisiana Legislature was in fact
preventing inheritance by children simply because their parents were
unmarried, a practice which has been condemned by the Supreme
Court in regard to illegitimate children, the statute violates the Equal
Protection Clause. 16 3 Due to equal protection concerns, the legislature
should consider permitting posthumously conceived children born to
unmarried couples the legal status it permits those whose parents
were married or to those permitted illegitimate children born during
the lives of both parents.
B. Oral and Written Consent
In order for the legal status granted by Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:391.1 to take effect, a decedent is required to have "specifically
authorized in writing his surviving spouse to use his gametes." It is
questionable whether this requirement is an adequate protection of the
decedent's interest. A mere written authorization that a spouse may
use one's gametes does not convey the donor's desire that the
gametes be used after his death. If, however, the legislature believed
initial consent to use the gametes sufficiently expressed a post-
mortem intent to procreate, then the exclusive method of determining
consent need not be written form.
The requirement of a writing fails to consider that the decision to
preserve sperm may have been last-minute, prompted by a fear that
medical treatment may result in sterility.'" It also fails to consider
the possibility of a statement made in confidence, such as to a doctor,
or other uninterested evidence, illuminating the decedent's intent that
161. La. R.S. 9:931.1(A) (2001).
162. Report and Recommendations of the Louisiana Task Force on Assisted
Conception and Artificial Means of Reproduction at 7-8 (2001).
163. SeeTrimblev. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,767-71,97 S. Ct. 1459, 1463-1467
(1977) (finding the interests of the state in promoting family and efficiency in the
system were not substantially related to the statue purpose, and thus the statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution).
164. See Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 963 (D. Ariz. 2002)
(Despite the doctor's recommendation of immediate cancer treatment, plaintiffs
husband delayed treatments in order to deposit and preserve his sperm).
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his spouse use his gametes, perhaps even after death. Consent
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence would better protect
the decedent's interests.
CONCLUSION
Advances in technology have produced gaps in the law and now
force legislators to confront difficult ethical and legal issues.
Whether children conceived posthumously by artificial insemination
may inherit from their biological fathers is a problem few legislatures
have been willing to address. Most of those that addressed
posthumous conception failed to protect the children, instead creating
barriers against their inheritance. Although cases resolve the issues
created by posthumous conception, their results vary and are limited
only to the rights of the specific parties involved. In order for the
inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children to be
adequately addressed, there must be specific legislation that addresses
not only the litigants' rights, but also the rights of all posthumously
conceived children.
By successfully balancing the legal interests of the state, the
decedent, and the posthumously conceived child, Louisiana's
legislation serves as a model for those states contemplating legislation
on the matter. However, other states should consider the flaws of
Louisiana's legislation, particularly those concerning the
posthumously conceived children of unmarried parents.
Nonetheless, the flaws in Louisiana's legislation are curable and the
state's legislation is a tremendous step forward for children and
medical science.
Brianne M, Star*
* The author thanks Professor Lucy S. McGough for her invaluable
assistance and guidance in writing this comment.
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